Whereas Wal-Mart scored a major victory for employers in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), its saga continues as former class members continue to pursue class claims in regional forums. As we previously have discussed (here, here, here and here), former Dukes plaintiffs … Continue Reading
As we previously reported, following the re-booting of discrimination claims by a member of the former class in Dukes et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a Texas federal district court judge dismissed the individual and class claims of that plaintiff. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the named … Continue Reading
In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a proposed class of 1.5 million women who claimed they were discriminated against in separate hiring and promotion decisions by different managers throughout the nation. Many defendants (and a few courts) read this federal Title VII decision for the proposition that statistical evidence was somehow an improper method of proof in class actions -- a method which was denigrated by the short-hand term "trial by formula."
The decision of the California Court of Appeal in Williams v. Superior Court (Allstate) makes clear, however, that the analysis of the proposed Title VII class in Dukes has little or no application to California wage and hour claims. As the Court explained, “We agree with those courts that have found Dukes distinguishable in comparable situations.”
Indeed, the Court's four-page distinguishing analysis of Dukes is extremely thorough. In particular, the Williams Court noted that Dukes was concerned with provisions of federal Rule 23 that do not apply under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382. As a result, "the trial court's reliance on Dukes analysis of subpart (b)(2) of Rule 23 – a class action seeking injunctive relief – was thus misplaced because appellant’s class members here were seeking principally, if not exclusively, monetary damages."
In addition, wage and hour claims normally turn on objective standards regarding the number of hours worked and wages paid. For class certification purposes such claims are thus fundamentally different from the discrimination claims at issue in Dukes "which depended on proof of the subjective intents of thousands of individual supervisors."
Finally, the Williams Court clarified the phrase "Trial by Formula," explaining that statistical inference is a perfectly valid method of establishing damages, and is no obstacle to certification where a class-wide policy or practice is alleged as the basis for liability.
Trial by Formula is a method of calculating damages. Damage calculations have little, if any, relevance at the certification stage before the trial court and parties have reached the merits of the class claims. At the certification stage, the concern is whether class members have raised a justiciable question applicable to all class members. Although Allstate may have presented evidence that its official policies are lawful, this showing does not end the inquiry. Here, the question is whether Allstate had a practice of not paying adjusters for off-the-clock time. The answer to that question will apply to the entire class of adjusters. If the answer to that question is “yes” – which is the answer the trial court initially assumed when it first certified the Off-the-Clock class, and is the answer we must presume in reviewing decertification (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1023) – then, in Duke’s phrase, that answer is the “glue” that binds all the class members. If some adjusters had more uncompensated time off the clock than other adjusters, that difference goes to damages.
(Internal punctuation and citations omitted).
Williams continues the recent post-Brinker trend of finding that class treatment of California wage and hour claims is generally proper so long as the question of liability is tied to an alleged class-wide policy or practice of the employer. It also clarifies that the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Dukes is no impediment to certification in such a case.